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Religious Exceptionalism and
Human Rights
Laura S. Underkuffler
1. Introduction
When we think of human rights and religion, we generally think of complimentary—
or even subsumed—ideas. Human rights include all of those human capacities and
freedoms that are essential to human existence. This includes freedom of religion.
And although there are disputes in the twenty-first century world legal order about
some human-rights claims, freedom of religion is not one of them. It is universally
recognized, at least as an abstract idea, as a fundamental human right.
However, this happy identity of religion and human rights is a superficial
one. This is because freedom of religion, asserted as a human right by one person,
might involve—as its consequence or even its object—the denial of the human
rights of others. When this occurs, the simple identity of religion and human rights
breaks down; instead the two become severe antagonists.
In this essay, I will explore the issues involved in the antagonism between
religion and human rights. In particular, I will examine these issues in the context
of a current and heated controversy: whether freedom of religion, as a human
right, entitles an individual or group to discriminate against gay, lesbian, or
transgender individuals or couples for religious reasons. For example, a municipal
clerk might refuse to issue a same-sex marriage license or to register a samesex civil partnership;1 an employee of a government contractor (hired to provide
counseling services to government employees) might refuse to provide samesex relationship counseling;2 or a physician might refuse to provide infertility
treatment to a lesbian woman, all on asserted religious grounds.3

1
2
3

See, e.g., In the Matter of Marriage Commissioners Appointed Under the Marriage Act,
1995, 2011 SKCA 3 (Canada).
See, e.g., Walden v. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, No. 1:08-cv-02278-JEC
(N.D. Ga. 2010).
See, e.g., North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group v. Benitez, 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2496605
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The case for religious exceptionalism in such settings was recently articulated
by litigants in a prominent Canadian case. At issue, opponents declared, was
whether courts could “force [Christian] marriage commissioners [to] perform gay
‘marriages.’”4 Legal counsel for the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada, which
prosecuted the case, observed that “‘[o]ur high court has consistently noted that
the right to freedom of religion is broad and [that] it includes the right to belief
and the right to act on those beliefs. . . . It is the role of governments in Canada
to ensure [that] all enjoy these cherished freedoms.’”5 Their religious beliefs,
opponents argued, were integral parts of their lives, and must be accommodated by
the government. Any attempt by the government to force marriage commissioners
to violate their personal religious beliefs and “privatize” their religious faith must
be opposed.6
The clash between the religious rights of some and the civil rights of others
is a complex and deep matter. In this essay, I cannot hope to address all aspects
of this issue. However, I will attempt to establish that such cases are not ones
of simple religious accommodation, as religious advocates argue. Furthermore, I
will argue that whatever the merits of the general idea of religious exceptionalism,
it cannot prevail in conflicts with identity-based human rights.

2. Religious Freedom, Religious Exceptionalism:
Some Foundational Issues
Because of its long history of asserted protection for both religious rights and
other human rights, the jurisprudence of the United States is a rich trove when it
comes to issues of religious/human-rights conflicts.
Human rights—or “civil rights,” as legally protected human rights in
American jurisprudence are called—are a subset of the broader category of
established secular norms and secular law. As a general proposition, the approach
of American courts and legislatures toward religion/state relations has been one of
presumed acceptance of religious exceptionalism in cases of conflict with secular
law. It is a legal truism that religious belief cannot be controlled by the state,
and is afforded absolute protection by law.7 In addition, the idea that religious

4
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6
7

See Rebecca Millette, “Sask. Premier Defends Decision to Force Marriage Commissioners
[to] Perform Gay ‘Marriages,’” LifeSiteNews.com, January 24, 2011, www.lifesitenews.
com/news/sask-premier-defends-decision-to-force-marriage-commissioners-perform-gay/
(accessed July 18, 2012).
Ibid.
Ibid.
See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603–605 (1961); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 304–305 (1940).
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freedom involves religious practice, and thus—in the case of conflict—requires
the compromise of secular norms, is a familiar one in American jurisprudence.
Whether imposed by statutory language or court decision, the idea that freedom
of religion requires “special” or “exceptional” treatment to ensure its protection
is taken for granted in large swaths of American law. For many years, the United
States Supreme Court required special, exceptional protection for religious
practice when it conflicted with secular law.8 Today, religious exceptionalism as a
presumptive value continues to exist in federal, state, and local laws.9
Religious exceptionalism, as an idea, is simple; its implementation, however,
is not. Even where it an accepted principle, serious issues lurk just below the
surface. These include the definition of “religion”; the meaning of “exercise”; and
the limits of their protection.

2.1 What is “Religion”?
One of the most difficult issues in a regime of religious exceptionalism is deciding
what “religion” is for this purpose. In a society in which asserted religious
identities are limited in kind and relatively noncontroversial, the formulation of an
understanding of “religion” might not generate much controversy. However, in a
nation of celebrated religious pluralism, such as the United States, deciding what
beliefs are religious (and thus afforded exceptional treatment) can be a difficult,
foundational conundrum.
In its constitutional jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court has
long contended with this issue. In early opinions, the Court defined religion in
traditional, theistic terms. For instance, the essence of religion was stated to be
“a belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any

8

9

See, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Thomas v. Review Board,
450 U.S. 707, 717–719 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220–221 (1972). In
1990, the Court attempted to eliminate the idea that religious believers are presumptively
exempt, as a federal constitutional matter, from otherwise neutral and generally applicable
secular laws. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). This led to a
struggle with Congress and the subsequent enactment of two federal laws that attempted
to reassert religious exceptionalism. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42
U.S.C. §2000bb et. seq.; Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42
U.S.C. §2000cc et. seq.. The Supreme Court struck down the first, as beyond Congressional
power. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The second has so far survived.
See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. (employment discrimination); 42 U.S.C. §2000 cc et.
seq. (institutionalized persons and land use); 50 U.S.C. App. §451 et. seq. (compulsory
military service).
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human relation,”10 or “one’s views of his relations to his Creator, and . . . the
obligations they impose.”11
The presence of well-known but non-theistic religions presented a persistent
challenge to theistic understandings. In 1961, the Court succumbed to this reality
and adopted a broader approach. In a now-famous footnote, the Court included
non-theistic religions such as Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, and Secular
Humanism within its “religious” definition.12 The Court subsequently clarified
that non-theistic beliefs that meet the “test of religion” are those that are “sincere
and meaningful” and occupy a place in the life of those who hold it parallel to that
filled by the orthodox belief in God.13 In an attempt to further limit religious claims,
the Court has consistently insisted that religious belief is more than philosophic
conviction.14 However, it has not, to date, explained just how religious beliefs differ
from philosophical ones. Scholarly attempts to fill this void include suggestions
that religion should be understood as an individual’s “ultimate concern,”15 or that
it is “the affirmation of some truth, reality, or value” that addresses fundamental
issues of human existence.16 However, why philosophical convictions do not also
meet these criteria remains unexplained.
One might argue that defining religion is a more theoretical than practical
problem, since we generally know what religion is. For instance, it is universally
acknowledged in liberal democratic countries that the so-called “Abrahamic
faiths” of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism are religions, and their prevalence
means that the vast majority of religious disputes involve these beliefs.
Indeed, a justice of the United States Supreme Court recently argued that the
popular acceptance of particular faiths can in practice be dispositive of their
recognition by government. The establishment of monotheism by government
is permissible, he wrote, because monotheism—as exhibited by Christianity,
Judaism, and Islam—accounts for 97.7% of all religious believers in the United
States.17 Thus, for practical reasons if for no other, the Establishment Clause of
the Constitution, in his view, “permits . . . disregard of polytheists and believers

United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633–634 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n. 11 (1961).
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
See Yoder, 406 U.S. (above n. 8), 215–216.
See “Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion,” Harvard Law Review 91 (1978):
1056, 1071.
16 John H. Mansfield, “Conscientious Objection—1964 Term,” in Religion and the Public
Order, ed. David A. Gianella (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 3, 10.
17 McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 2753 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10
11
12
13
14
15
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in unconcerned deities” by government in its acknowledgment of religion in
American life.18
Although a rough-cut approach such as this might (arguably) be sufficient
in some contexts, it cannot suffice when the question is claimed religious
exceptionalism from secular norms. When religious exceptionalism is asserted,
the issue at hand is the protection of the claimant’s religious (human) rights. The
most powerful reason for recognizing human-rights claims in law is to protect
them from denial by the majority. When that issue is raised, there must be a more
principled reason for granting or denying an asserted faith excepted status than
that it does, or does not, enjoy majoritarian support.
Problems involved in determining religious legitimacy are compounded
when it is remembered that the question involves not only the recognition of a
“religious” group, but also the recognition of particular beliefs of individuals
within that group. The inherently subjective nature of religion has led American
courts to refuse to examine the existence, legitimacy, or sincerity of declared
religious belief. Famously, the United States Supreme Court pronounced in
United States v. Ballard19 that “[m]en may believe what they cannot prove. . . .
Religious expressions which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible
to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken of mortals does not mean
that they can be made suspect before the law.”20
Occasionally, courts have articulated outer boundaries to this tolerance,
although these boundaries appear to be little more than the exercise of subjective
judgment. For instance, a lower federal court opined that constitutional protection
does not extend to “so-called religions that tend to mock established institutions
and are obviously shams and absurdities and whose members are patently devoid
of religious sincerity.”21 However, how one separates those that are “obviously
shams and absurdities” from those that are not remains unexplained. In a very
recent case, Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum,22 the Supreme Court was
presented with professed followers of the religion of Summum, which was stated
to have been founded in 1975 and presently headquartered in Salt Lake City,
Utah. Summum is said to involve belief in the “Seven Aphorisms,” which are
similar in some ways to the Ten Commandments of Judaism and Christianity. It
is also claimed to be inspired by a visit of other-worldly beings, and to involve—

18 See ibid. For a critique of this argument, see Laura S. Underkuffler, “Through a Glass
Darkly: Van Orden, McCreary, and the Dangers of Transparency in Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence,” First Amendment Law Review 5 (2006): 59.
19 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
20 Ibid., 86–87 (citations omitted).
21 Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390, 395 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003 (1974).
22 Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
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as core practices—the fermentation of a sacramental nectar, the mummification
of remains, and the preparation of a sexual ointment called Mehr.23 Owing
undoubtedly to the inherent difficulty in evaluating such religious claims, the
United States Supreme Court assumed (without discussion) that this was a
religious organization and that the beliefs asserted by its followers were bona
fide.24 Another recent case, Cutter v. Wilkinson,25 involved assertions of religious
exceptionalism by state prisoners who claimed to be believers in the Church of
Jesus Christ Christian, a white supremacist organization; followers of Asatru,
a polytheistic religion with claimed Northern European origins; a Satanist;
and a witch.26 To avoid the religious-assessment problem, the state defendants
stipulated that the prisoners were members of bona fide religions and that they
were sincere in their beliefs—conclusions that the Supreme Court simply adopted
without comment.27
The refusal of courts to examine the legitimacy or sincerity of professed
religious beliefs, of course, creates problems of its own. When the question is the
granting of religious exceptionalist claims, the problems involved in leaving the
existence, definition, and sincerity of religious beliefs to the individual adherent
are obvious. As the United States Supreme Court has observed, government cannot
afford to create a situation in which “each conscience is a law unto itself.”28 Yet,
to attempt to foreclose claims as a definitional matter runs afoul of prohibitions
against state-imposed orthodoxy29 and would involve the courts in the difficult
and unseemly task of external validation. As a result, courts remain in a precarious
position, committed (in principle) to honor all religious claims, while wary (in
practice) of what this might mean.

2.2 What is Protected “Exercise”?
Assuming that cognizable “religious” status is established, a regime of religious
exceptionalism requires a final, important step. Even if the religious nature of the

23
24
25
26
27
28
29

See www.summum.us/about/welcome.shtml (accessed July 18, 2012).
See Summum, 555 U.S. (above n. 22), 460.
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. (above n. 8), 709.
Ibid., 712.
Ibid., 713.
Smith, 494 U.S. (above n. 8), 890.
At a minimum, the enforcement of government decrees regarding these questions risks
“establishing a notion respecting religion” in violation of the American Constitution’s
Establishment Clause. See, e.g., School District of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
215 (1963) (the United States Constitution requires “absolute equality before the law, of
all religious opinions and sects”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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belief is established, one must determine whether the particular “exercise” of that
belief is one that can be protected by law.
When it comes to legal protection for religious claims, the separate categories
of religious belief, identity, and action must be remembered. If the case simply
involves religious belief, or the assertion of religious identity (without more), it
is a relatively easy one. Because contemporary liberal democracies rarely attempt
to determine the beliefs in citizens’ minds, or criminalize identity alone, cases
involving religious beliefs or the assertion of religious identity will rarely present
conflicts with secular law. One can imagine unusual cases, such as where religious
identity or belief is intertwined with what the state believes to be a prohibited
terrorist affiliation or organization. However, cases in which simple religious
identity or belief qua belief conflicts with state criminal or civil law will be rare.
Almost always, it will be action—such as advocacy, or more—that will trigger the
religious/secular conflict.
It is, thus, in the realm of religiously based action that most difficulties
emerge. A regime of religious exceptionalism must have some way to distinguish
protected religious claims to act from those who are not protected, lest religious
actors become anarchic powers beyond the reach of the law. Whatever the precise
formulation, the goals of this winnowing process are generally these: to identify
religious beliefs that are important; that are seriously impaired by secular law; and
that will not be too damaging to secular interests, should the claim to religious
privilege be granted.
American law is rife with tests of this sort. Reflecting a typical approach,
American constitutional law long held that religiously based action is protected if
it is required by a central religious belief; is substantially burdened by government
action; and is not outweighed by any compelling government interest.30
Implementing these tests has been fraught with practical difficulties, some
integrally related to the problems previously discussed. For example, the
requirement that the religious action involve a “central” religious belief, and that
the belief be “burdened” by government, yields little substance in practice. Since

30 See Hernandez, 490 U.S. (above n. 8), 699; Thomas, 450 U.S. (above n. 8), 717–719;
Yoder, 406 U.S. (above n. 8), 220–221. This approach was abandoned by the United
States Supreme Court—as a doctrinal matter—in 1990. See Smith, 494 U.S. (above n.
8), 878–890. In Smith, a religious drug use case, the Court held that if prohibiting or
burdening the exercise of religion is not the object of the law, and merely “the incidental
effect of a generally applicable . . . provision,” the First Amendment is not offended.
See ibid., 878. This change had the effect—in form, at least—of abolishing religious
exceptionalism in federal constitutional cases. It did not mean, of course, that federal
statutes, state constitutions, and state statutes could not continue to use this approach, as
indeed they have.
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(again) the nature and requirements of religious belief must be left to the declarant,
there are few claims (if any) that can be eliminated by these tests. As a result, the
“centrality” and “burden” tests have been little discussed by American courts, and
only rarely have they played any role in the court’s disposition of the claim.31
With the “centrality” and “burden” tests relatively meaningless, it is the
final, “compelling interest” test that limits religious exceptionalism in American
courts. This test represents, of course, the crux of the matter. Religious claims,
however important to the adherent and however impaired by government action,
must yield—at some point—to secular state concerns. Religious exceptionalism,
however much we might value it in principle, cannot be interpreted to allow
religious adherents to engage in rape, pillage, mayhem, and murder. Under
any interpretation, religious exceptionalism must yield—at some point—to the
essential values protected by government.
The question is what that point is. In American law, divining any overarching
principles from judicial decisions in this area is difficult. For instance, past Supreme
Court decisions have held particular government interests to be compelling,
or not, with little in the way of articulated reasons. Compelling state interests
were found in the forced participation of citizens in the social security system,
in compulsory military service, and in the prohibition of polygamy.32 Less-thancompelling government interests were found in universal childhood education,
work requirements for participation in state unemployment compensation plans,
and licensing and taxing systems that govern in-person solicitation activities.33

31 Such rare cases include Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S.
290, 304–305 (1985) (denying constitutional free-exercise claim on the ground that the
government action did not actually burden the claimant’s religious beliefs); Hernandez,
490 U.S. (above n.8), 699 (although “[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’
interpretation of those creeds, ... [w]e do, however, have doubts [as to] whether the alleged
burden [in this case] . . . is a substantial one”).
32 See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (rejecting Native Americans’ claims for exception
from assignment of Social Security numbers); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)
(rejecting Amish claim for exemption from participation in the Social Security system);
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (rejecting claim for exemption by a selective
(compulsory military) service inductee who opposed war on religious grounds); Late
Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S.
1 (1890) (denying Mormons’ asserted right to practice polygamy); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (same).
33 See Yoder, 406 U.S. (above n. 8), 205 (accepting claim of religious adherent to exemption
from compulsory education of children after the eighth grade); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (invalidating state unemployment rules that
conditioned the availability of benefits upon an applicant’s willingness to work under
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Although one can imagine reasons that support each of these determinations,
there are also good reasons that do not. For instance, the state would seem to
suffer relatively little harm if it allowed religious groups to provide their own
old-age assistance to their members,34 whereas the state’s interest in childhood
education would seem to be profound.35
The problem in the articulation of standards is that the government
interests that oppose religious claims are as diverse as the reasons for the
existence of government itself. At one extreme are interests that are fundamental
to an organized society—interests which, if abandoned, would endanger the
state’s existence. At the other extreme are interests that promote general social
(but ultimately nonessential) “well being,”36 such as those that are involved in the
positive but non-essential running of the modern bureaucratic state. In a regime
of religious exceptionalism, claimed religious privilege must certainly yield to
the former, while it would almost as certainly—if it has any meaning—trump the
latter. The problem is where, along this spectrum, particular religious claims lie.
*****
To summarize the situation thus far, it is clear that there are difficult issues that are
an inherent part of the implementation of any regime of religious exceptionalism
through law. When the question is the conferral of extra-legal privilege,
establishing the boundaries of that privilege is critical. Yet, the inherently
subjective nature of religious identity, religious sincerity, and required religious
exercise seem antithetical—by their very nature—to state definition and control.
Beyond that issue, there is the difficult task of weighing religious claims against
competing state interests.
One could respond to these difficulties by concluding that regimes of religious
exceptionalism are inherently unworkable and should, therefore, be abandoned by
post-modern legislatures and courts.37 The fact remains, however, that protection

34
35
36

37

conditions forbidden by his or her religion); Thomas, 450 U.S. (above n. 8), 707 (same);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (striking down licensing and taxing
systems that restricted religious speech and solicitations); Cantwell, 310 U.S. (above n.
7), 296 (same).
See Lee, 455 U.S. (above n. 32), 252.
See Yoder, 406 U.S. (above n. 8), 205.
See Laura Underkuffler-Freund, “The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A
Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory,” William and Mary Law Review 38
(1995): 837, 924.
For classic statements of this view in the American constitutional context, see Christopher
L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, “The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional
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of religious belief and practice from secular governments continues to occupy
a special place in most liberal democratic thought.38 If the idea of religious
exceptionalism in law is to exist, under some circumstances, what should those
circumstances be?
Against the background previously discussed, and for the remainder of this
essay, I will consider this question in a specific context: the clash between religious
exceptionalism and gay, lesbian, and transgender individuals’ civil rights.

3. The Clash with Civil Rights
The protection of human rights, as legal “civil rights,” is a ubiquitous feature
of liberal democratic constitutional government. In the United States, general
prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of race, color, gender, religion,
and national origin have been entrenched for decades in national and state laws.
Although still a patchwork affair, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
has been increasingly added to the prohibited list in various states. As of this
writing, almost half of the states and the District of Columbia have laws prohibiting
sexual-orientation discrimination in public and private-sector employment.39
Statutes and ordinances also prohibit sexual-orientation discrimination in public
accommodations, housing, and credit.40 Perhaps most dramatically, nine states
and the District of Columbia currently authorize same-sex marriage as a legal
right.41
Recognition of guarantees of civil rights and the principle of religious
exceptionalism by the same legal order creates an inherently volatile mix. It is
virtually inevitable that the religious beliefs and practices of some will conflict with

38

39
40
41

Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct,” University of Chicago Law Review 61 (1994):
1245; and William P. Marshall, “In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism,”
University of Chicago Law Review 58 (1991): 308.
Elsewhere I have argued that under American law, the protection of religious conscience
has—and should have—real meaning, and that this includes some protection from the
mandate of secular law. See, e.g., Laura S. Underkuffler, “Public Funding for Religious
Schools: Difficulties and Dangers in a Pluralistic Society,” Oxford Review of Education
27 (2001): 577, 584–588; Underkuffler, “Yoder and the Question of Equality,” Capital
University Law Review 25 (1996): 789; Underkuffler, “Individual Conscience and the
Law,” DePaul Law Review 42 (1002): 93.
See “Sexual Orientation Discrimination: Your Rights,” www.nolo.com/legal–encyclopedia/
sexual-orientation-discrimination-rights-29541.html (accessed July 18, 2012).
“Sexual Discrimination and Orientation,” US Legal Law Digest, http://lawdigest.uslegal.
com/civil-rights/sexual-discrimination-and-orientation/7177 (accessed July 18, 2012).
Those states are Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New York, Vermont, and Washington.
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the civil rights of others at a certain point, and that religious adherents will claim
exemption from those civil-rights guarantees. Although not the typical religiousexemption case, there have been many American cases in past decades that have
pitted religious exceptionalism claims against state efforts to enforce civil rights.
For instance, claims to a right to engage in race, gender, and religious discrimination
on religious grounds have been asserted repeatedly in American courts.42
With the advent of legal recognition of civil rights for gay, lesbian, and
transgender individuals, claims of religious exceptionalism have intensified. The
popular press is rife with accounts of religious individuals or organizations that
vow to hold fast to their beliefs and deny services, products, or membership to
gay, lesbian, or transgender individuals on religious grounds. Religious objections
have been emphasized by opponents in the rhetorical war over proposed same-sex
marriage legitimization.
In an attempt to defuse the issue, proponents of same-sex marriage have often
employed conciliatory language, making clear that (under existing and proposed
law) religious institutions and religious clergy would be exempt from performing
same-sex marriages.43 However, the exemption of clergy and religious
institutions has not silenced critics. Religious freedom, they claim, extends not
only to religious institutions and their clergy, but also to religious individuals.
In one of the most strident statements, a Baptist minister recently editorialized
that: “. . . the legalization of same-sex ‘marriage’ really is a threat to religious
freedom. While ministers may not be required to perform such pseudo-weddings,
there is no protection for religious individuals who prefer not to be party to such
an absurdity. Photographers, caterers, DJs, hotels, limousine drivers, teachers,

42 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Bob Jones University v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (race); Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights
Commission, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985), reversed on other grounds, 477 U.S. 619 (1986)
(gender); Dolter v. Wahlert High School, 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980) (gender);
State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985), dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986) (religion). See generally, Laura S. Underkuffler,
“‘Discrimination’ on the Basis of Religion: An Examination of Attempted Value Neutrality
in Employment,” William and Mary Law Review 30 (1989): 581, 589–599 (discussing the
issue, cases, statutory claims, and defenses).
43 For example, a bitter dispute in Maine involved whether the Secretary of State—a samesex marriage opponent—had to include mention of a religious exemption for clergy in the
submission of the question of same-sex marriage to a popular vote. See Susan M. Cover,
“Public Has Its Say on Wording of Same-Sex Marriage Referendum,” Portland Press
Herald, July 18, 2012, A1. It is a well-settled American legal principle that religious groups
and institutions, as well as their clergy, are exempt from anti-discrimination laws when
engaged in private religious practice. See Laura S. Underkuffler, “Odious Discrimination
and the Religious Exemption Question,” Cardozo Law Review 32 (2011): 2069, 2071–2072.
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and others will be subject to loss of employment or legal prosecution for any
conscientious dissent or refusal to participate.” 44
The response of scholars, to date, has been cautious. Even those who are
generally supportive of equal rights generally view the appropriate legal response
in this context to be one of presumptive religious accommodation.45
How should we analyze these cases? To begin with, the foundational
question—as noted above—is not new. Claims for religious exemption from
conflicting civil-rights laws have been asserted as long as both have existed. How
has this clash been resolved in other contexts?
In the United States, litigation for years, and at all levels, has established
that race discrimination will not be tolerated by courts, whatever its purported
justification. In Loving v. Virginia, the most famous case of this kind, the United
States Supreme Court struck down a state anti-miscegenation statute that prohibited
a “white” person from marrying any person other than another “white” person.46
In the process, the Court stated that “this Court has consistently repudiated ‘[d]
istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry’ as being ‘odious to
a free people.’”47 The statute’s religious roots had been cited by the trial court
in its sustaining of the statute.48 These were ignored by the Supreme Court as
apparently irrelevant.49 In Bob Jones University v. United States,50 decided sixteen
years later, the Court explicitly addressed a religious claim and held that it could

44 Sandy Williams, “Civil Marriage and Religious Marriage Are One and the Same,” Portland
Press Herald, June 22, 2012, A8
45 See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, “What Same-Sex Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have
in Common,” Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy 5 (2010): 206, 207–208;
Douglas W. Kmiec, “Same-Sex Marriage and the Coming Antidiscrimination Campaigns
Against Religion,” in Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty: Emerging Conflicts,
ed. Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., and Robin Fretwell Wilson (Lanham,
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Company, Inc., 2008), 103, 109; Colleen
Theresa Rutledge, “Caught in the Crossfire: How Catholic Charities of Boston Was Victim
to the Clash Between Gay Rights and Religious Freedom,” Duke Journal of Gender, Law
and Policy 15 (2008): 297, 297–300, 305-309; Robin Fretwell Wilson, “Insubstantial
Burdens: The Case for Government Employee Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage Laws,”
Northwestern Journal of Law and Policy 5 (2010): 318.
46 See Loving, 388 U.S. (above n.42), 5 n. 4.
47 Ibid., 11 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 [1943]).
48 In the trial court’s words, “Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay,
and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his
arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages.” Ibid. 3 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
49 See ibid.; Underkuffler, “Odious Discrimination” (above n. 43), 2073.
50 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. (above n. 42), 574.
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not justify a private institution’s policy of racial discrimination.51 After Bob Jones,
no claim of religious exceptionalism from racial-equality laws has been seriously
entertained by any American court.
The same judicial intolerance has characterized cases dealing with
discrimination on the basis of color or national origin. Discrimination on the
basis of either has been declared by the Supreme Court to be “unfair, unjust, and
inconsistent with the public policy of the United States.”52 As a result, any claim
to engage in such discrimination has been highly suspect. Today, there is no
contemporary statutory or judicial authority for the idea that a claimed religious
imperative can be used to justify discrimination of this sort.
Discrimination on the basis of gender or sex, although only more recently
actionable, is also prohibited widely by American civil-rights laws today. The
eradication of gender or sex discrimination in employment, housing, educational
opportunity, and other settings has been described by the Supreme Court as a
national priority of the highest order.53 Any claim of a right to treat men and
women differently is subject to rigorous scrutiny, and must be proven to be
required by a particular employment, educational, or other setting.54 The same
refusal to “except” religious claims in the racial context is also true here.55

The last, ubiquitous civil-rights provision prohibits discrimination
on the basis of religion. As a superficial matter, religious discrimination
is placed into the same legal basket as is race, color, national origin, and
gender discrimination. As stated in the Bob Jones case, discrimination
on the basis “of . . . race, color, creed, or national origin” has long been
condemned in American law.56
There is, however, a potential difference in the protection (for example) of
one’s “race” and the protection of one’s “religion.” Race (like gender, color, and
national origin) is simply a statement of one’s status or identity: an individual
is Asian, or black, or white. It is simply a statement of a particular personal
characteristic. Religious discrimination, in the field of civil rights, might be
similar. For instance, an individual might be the subject of discrimination because
she was a Catholic, Muslim, Jew, or Jain.

51 See ibid., 604. See also Underkuffler, “Odious Discrimination” (above n. 43), 2074.
52 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. (above n. 42), 594–595 (quoting Executive Order Number 11,063, 3
C.F.R. 652 [1959–1963]) (internal quotation marks omitted).
53 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
54 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, §703(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(e)(1) (setting
forth the requirements for a gender-based bona fide occupational qualification).
55 See Underkuffler, “Odious Discrimination” (above n. 43), 2079.
56 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. (above n. 42), 594–595.
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One would expect discrimination of this type to be on a par with discrimination
on the basis of race, color, gender, and national origin, and in American law, it
is.57 Also, as is true of the other categories, a religious basis for the discriminatory
actor’s conduct does not change this result. Under civil-rights laws and their
judicial interpretations, an individual’s religious beliefs (alone) cannot justify her
refusal to employ a Muslim, serve a Jain, or to rent to a Jew.
Religion can, however, be more than status or identity. It can also involve
conduct, or its expression in the world. For instance, there might be a refusal to
hire someone, or to rent to someone, who manifests particular attitudes or actions
that are the product of his religious (protected) beliefs. These “religious conduct”
cases are more complex. Because of the unlimited possibilities—described
above—for religious conduct claims,58 and their completely unpredictable
consequences for others, the legal status of these claims under civil-rights
guarantees is far more ambiguous. Although rooted in identity, religious conduct
that would otherwise be objectionable or actionable is not necessarily protected
by civil-rights laws.59
Distinguishing religious “identity” cases from religious “conduct” cases might
seem difficult at times. This is because “the kind of discrimination represented by
the first type (‘identity discrimination’) is often bound up with certain stereotypical
or assumed claims about the beliefs and conduct in which particular religious
groups engage and, thus, is ‘conduct-based’ to that extent.”60 The core distinction,
however, is clear. In discrimination of the first kind, an individual is the subject of
discrimination solely because of his religious affiliation or religious identity; there
is nothing objectionable about his conduct, of itself, if done by someone else. In
the cases of the second kind, the situation is different. It is the conduct itself that
is objectionable; and it would be objectionable no matter what the identity of the
person who engages in it.61
It is the religious-identity case, then, that is the classic civil-rights case. In
such cases, does it matter if the discriminatory actor is, himself, motivated by
religious conviction? Does it matter if an employer refuses to hire a Muslim
because the employer is a Christian, or a landlord refuses to rent to a Jain because
the landlord is a Jew?
Contrary to the narrative often told in elementary school textbooks, the
United States had a long colonial history of religious-identity discrimination

57 See Underkuffler, “‘Discrimination’ on the Basis of Religion” (above n. 42), passim.
58 See text notes 10–36 above.
59 See Underkuffler, “Odious Discrimination” (above n. 43), 2077; Underkuffler,
“‘Discrimination’” (above n. 42), passim.
60 Underkuffler, “Odious Discrimination” (above n. 43), 2077.
61 See ibid.
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and persecution. Religious oppression and persecution was a virulent reality in
virtually all of the American colonies, and persisted in many newly formed states
until the nineteenth century.62 It was this historical experience that impelled the
eventual adoption of religious equality provisions in the national constitution, state
constitutions, and other laws. This early history, and the existence of continuing
discriminatory practices against some religious groups, have made the eradication
of religious discrimination in civic participation, housing, employment, and other
aspects of public and private life a bedrock principle in the United States. Because
of the importance of this principle, and the ease with which it could be undermined
by religious claims, there is no support today for the claim that religious-identity
discrimination is legally sanctioned if claimed to be “compelled” or required by
the discriminatory actor’s religious beliefs.
There is, thus, a fixed consensus in the United States—and, I would posit,
in other liberal democratic countries—that identity discrimination by the
government, as determined by race, color, national origin, gender, or religion,
is inconsistent with fundamental liberal-democratic principles. The same is
true of discrimination by private individuals, when they are actors in the public
sphere. And this conviction does not change because the discriminatory conduct
is claimed, by the discriminatory actor, to be compelled by his religious beliefs.
The prevalence of these principles raises an important question. Why is this
so? Why is it so clear to liberal democratic societies that discrimination on the
basis of race, color, national origin, gender, and religion is odious to the liberal
democratic order? And, furthermore, that the religious beliefs of discriminatory
actors do not impact this principle?
The theoretical underpinnings for these principles are rarely articulated by
legislatures or courts; they are assumed to be self-evident to the liberal-democratic
reader. It is assumed by the institutions of government that a liberal-democratic
order must grant citizenship, political power, and civic participation in all of its
forms to all of its members on an equal basis. Subsequent conduct may, of course,
disqualify individuals from these rights; for instance, conviction of a crime may
mean forfeiture of freedom, or the right to vote. However, simple identity cannot be
the basis for the denial of these rights. An individual member of the polity cannot
be denied equal civic rights and civic participation because of her immutable,
biological characteristics. She cannot be denied participatory rights because of the
color of her skin, or the identity of her parents, or the sexual anatomy that she has
(or does not have). Nor can a member of the polity be denied those participatory
rights because of the preference—including the religious preference—of another

62 See Underkuffler, “The Separation of the Religious and the Secular” (above n. 36), 874–
960.
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polity member. Religion, as discussed above, is an inherently subjective set of
convictions determined by individual actors. Citizens’ convictions—no matter
how much we might ordinarily strive to honor them—cannot be honored if their
purpose or effect is to deny the basic political and civic participatory rights of
others. To honor such requests would be to contradict the most fundamental
principle of civic engagement and the governmental compact.
Given this consensus that rejects identity discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, gender, and national origin, we reach the final question: What
about discrimination on the basis of gay, lesbian, or transgender characteristics?
Is this a case, like the others, of prohibited identity discrimination?
For many years in the United States, homosexual or transgender identity
was viewed as something that was “voluntary” or “chosen” by the individual.
In the past twenty years, there has been a massive shift in medical and public
opinion on this issue. Today, the broader medical community has abandoned the
position that sexual orientation is a choice, mutable at will,63 as have some of
the most prominent spokespersons for that view.64 Changes in public opinion
have mirrored these developments. In the 1980s, American public opinion stood
overwhelmingly for the proposition that being gay or lesbian was a voluntary
choice; by 2009, only 36% of respondents to a public poll believed that to be
true.65 Understandings of transgender status or identity has undergone a similar
evolution. The American Psychiatric Association now recognizes the deep roots

63 See, e.g., Gregory M. Herek et. al., “Demographic, Psychological, and Social Characteristics
of Self-Identified Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Adults in a U.S. Probability Sample,”
Sexuality Research and Social Policy 7 (2010): 7, 176–200; Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704
F.Supp.2d 921, 966 (N.D. Cal. 2010), affirmed 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (“No credible
evidence supports a finding that an individual may, through conscious decision, therapeutic
intervention or any other method, change his or her sexual orientation.”).
64 See, e.g., Benedict Carey, “Psychiatry Giant Sorry for Backing Gay ‘Cure,’” The New York
Times, May 18, 2012, at A1 (discussing Dr. Robert L. Spitzer). On May 17, 2012, the Pan
American Health Organization issued a statement which concluded that treatments that
purport to “cure” people with non-heterosexual sexual orientation “lack medical justification
and represent a serious threat to the health and well-being of affected people.” “[T]here
is a professional consensus that homosexuality is a natural variation of human sexuality
and cannot be regarded as a pathological condition.” Pan American Health Organization/
World Health Organization, “Therapies” to Change Sexual Orientation Lack Medical
Justification and Threaten Health, http://new.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_ conte
nt&task=view&id=6803&Itemid=1926 (accessed July 18, 2012).
65 Quinnipiac University Poll (Apr. 21–27, 2009), www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm
(accessed July 18, 2012). For a general description of changing attitudes in the United
States, see Underkuffler, “Odious Discrimination” (above n. 43), 2079–2082.
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and immutability of transgender status,66 as have other medical professionals.
Changes in public attitudes regarding transgender status is reflected in a recent
survey of 636 major U.S. companies. Nearly one-third were found to now cover
the cost of gender-reassignment surgery under their employee benefit plans.67
With these shifts in attitudes have come shifts in legal understandings. In 1996,
the United States Supreme Court described homosexual status as a biological
“trait.”68 In a series of decisions, state supreme courts and lower federal courts
have described sexual orientation as an “integral . . . aspect of one’s identity,”69 “a
fundamental aspect of . . . human identity,”70 and as something that “may be altered
[if at all] only at the expense of significant damage to the individual’s sense of
self.”71 As noted above, protections against sexual-orientation discrimination are
now prevalent in federal, state, and local laws.72 Regarding transgender status, early
court decisions refused to extend civil-rights protections to transgendered persons,
apparently due to the belief that transgendered status was a voluntary choice.73
More recent court decisions have interpreted traditional civil-rights protections
to include transgendered persons,74 and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission—the federal agency charged with enforcing federal laws against
workplace discrimination—has ruled that discrimination against a transgender
employee on the basis of the employee’s gender identity is sex discrimination
prohibited by federal law.75 Thirteen states, the District of Columbia, and many
local governments explicitly include gender identity as a protected characteristic
in civil rights and hate-crimes legislation.76

66 See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (4th ed. 2000), 576–582 (transgender status describes a disjunction between an
individual’s sexual anatomy and sexual identity).
67 See http://ideas.time.com/2011/12/12/transgender-the-next-frontier-in-human-rights (accessed
July 18, 2012).
68 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
69 In Re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 385, 442 (Cal. 2008).
70 Karouni v. Gonzalez, 399 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th Cir. 2005).
71 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862, 893 (Iowa 2009).
72 See text at notes 39–41 above.
73 See Sunish Gulati, “The Use of Gender-Loaded Identities in Sex-Stereotyping
Jurisprudence,” New York University Law Review 78 (2003): 2177, 2187.
74 See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati,
401 F.3d 720 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004);
Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000); Schwenk v. Hartford,
204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000). For an extended discussion of recent cases see Glenn, 633
F.3d at 1318 n. 5.
75 See Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, Agency No. ATF-2011-00751 (April
20, 2012).
76 See Underkuffler, “Odious Discrimination” (above n. 43), 2089–2090.
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New public understandings of sexual orientation and transgender status have
left little life in old arguments that these identities are not immutable, personal
characteristics in the way that race, color, parentage, and gender are. The argument
that attractions to persons of the same sex, or repudiation of the biological gender
with which one has been identified, are simply “choices” or “actions” within the
control of the individual is no longer made by responsible members of the medical
profession or by sophisticated legal commentators.77 Furthermore, because sexual
orientation and transgender status are immutable, personal characteristics—like
race, color, parentage, and gender—there is no apparent basis for a difference
in their legal treatment. Gay, lesbian, and transgender individuals with these
characteristics should be presumptively entitled (like other protected groups) to
citizenship, political power, and civic participation in all of its forms, on an equal
basis with others.
What remains, of course, is the religious-exceptionalism question. Perhaps
sexual orientation and transgender status are protected, “identity” characteristics
of individuals; however, that fact alone does not answer the next question: should
religious individuals be required—by law—to serve, hire, house, or otherwise
publically engage with them on an equal basis, when the religions of those
individuals dictate otherwise?
As discussed above, religious exceptionalism claimed by individuals to
justify discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, gender, and
religious identity in public transactions and civic affairs is a discredited notion,
and presumptively invalid under American law. For religious exceptionalism
to survive in the sexual-orientation/transgender context, human-rights claims
on those grounds would have to be distinguished from those made on the other
grounds.
The usual argument for religious exceptionalism in this context is made
along the following lines: There is generally no argument that gay, lesbian,
and transgender status is itself different from the racial, parentage, religious,
or gender-related status that forms the basis for other, ubiquitously prohibited
forms of identity discrimination. Most advocates of religious exceptionalism
wholeheartedly agree that gay, lesbian, and transgender individuals may exist,
unmolested and presumptively equal to other citizens. That, they argue, is not
when religious exceptionalism is required or justified. Rather, it is required and

77 See, e.g., Golinski v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 984 (N.D.
Cal. 2012) (discussing courts’ rejection of “the mistaken assumption that sexual orientation
is merely ‘behavioral,’ rather than the sort of deeply rooted, immutable characteristic that
warrants heightened protection from discrimination”).
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justified when the issue is conduct by those individuals—and religious individuals
are required, by civil-rights laws, to participate in or ratify that conduct.
This argument is vividly illustrated by the same-sex marriage issue. In the
view of the Baptist pastor quoted above, it is not the simple status of gay or lesbian
individuals that is at issue; it is the conduct of those individuals. It is when gay
and lesbian individuals engage in “pseudo-marriages” that the religious exemption
question arises, and when religious individuals should not be forced to deal with
them.78 The portrayal of the situation is one of action. There must be “protection
for religious individuals who prefer not to be a party to . . . [the] absurdity of
gay marriage.” Photographers, caterers, hotel owners, teachers, and others should
not “be subject to loss of employment or legal prosecution for any . . . refusal to
participate.”79
This argument is an interesting sleight of hand. Describing the action
required of religious objectors subliminally suggests that gay or lesbian civil
rights claimants are engaging (fundamentally) in action as well. Does the fact
that the gay, lesbian, or transgender individual engages in action when renting an
apartment, seeking employment, getting married, hiring a caterer, and renting a
hotel room destroy this transaction as a (protected) identity claim?
This argument echoes, faintly, the identity/action distinction in religious civilrights claims discussed above.80 As the reader will recall, claimed discrimination
on the basis of religion can be of two kinds: discrimination on the basis of
identity—that is, an individual is not hired or afforded an apartment because she is
a Christian; and discrimination on the basis of conduct—an example being that an
individual desires to engage in otherwise objectionable conduct, such as absence
from work, for religious reasons but is denied the opportunity to do so. As pointed
out above, American law is extraordinarily protective of the claimant in the first
case, but less so in the second. Is this same template—protection for identity, but
not for conduct—applicable to the same-sex marriage case?
In fact, the conduct that is involved in these two contexts is of entirely different
kinds. The conduct in the religious discrimination “conduct” case is objectionable,
independent of the identity of the actor; the actor wishes to do something that work
rules, conventions, or laws otherwise forbid. The conduct in the same-sex marriage
case, on the other hand, is not objectionable in itself—or objectionable at all. It
is a permitted—indeed, in the United States, a constitutionally protected—right,
for others. It is only because of the identity of the gay or lesbian actor that the
objection arises. It is, thus, not a “conduct” case at all, but one of “identity” alone.

78 Williams, “Civil Marriage” (above n. 44).
79 Ibid. (emphasis added).
80 See text at notes 57–61 above.
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Indeed, upon further reflection, the religious objector’s “conduct” argument
must completely, and necessarily, collapse. All identity claims must involve
conduct or action by the civil-rights claimant if they are to be legally cognizable.
If an individual simply exists as black, Asian, Jewish, female, or gay, there is no
discriminatory action and no legal case. It is when that individual attempts to
act, and is denied, services or goods in the world—renting an apartment, buying
a house, obtaining a job, procuring a marriage license, hiring a caterer, and the
myriad of other activities that are a part of civic life—that there is any ground for
legal complaint or action.
There is, therefore, no doubt that same-sex
marriage cases, and other gay, lesbian, and transgender cases, involve identity
claims. There is no reason to subordinate them to the claims of religious objectors
on this basis. Is there any other?
There is a remaining objection that is often advanced. This objection accepts
the fact that gay, lesbian, and transgender status involves identity, and that
identity claims involve the equal right of individuals to act (in ways acted by
others) in the world. Rather, the objection is this. Although the identity claim
is real, and substantial, the burden on the religious objector—when required to
honor that claim—is also real and substantial. In a shootout between these claims,
on their theoretical merits, the religious claim might lose, as it concededly does
when it opposes civil-rights claims on the basis of race, color, national origin,
religion, and gender. However, the religious objector does not demand the ability
to engage in discrimination in its harshest forms; he demands only situational
accommodation. If the religious objector’s needs can be met without much harm
to the gay, lesbian, or transgender individual—indeed perhaps, in some cases,
without the discriminatee’s knowledge—then that accommodation should be
made. For instance, the religious objection should be honored if the gay, lesbian, or
transgender individual can obtain similar commercial services, accommodations,
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges elsewhere.81 Thus a city clerk should be
able to silently step aside, when asked to issue a same-sex marriage license, if she
knows that her colleague is available to perform the municipal function.82
The idea that religious accommodations could be made so that both sides win
is a very attractive suggestion. Religious freedom is highly valued in American
life, and no one wants to force a sincere religious adherent to do unnecessary
things that are abhorrent to her conscience. If accommodation can be made

81 See Marc D. Stern, “Liberty v. Equality: Equality v. Liberty,” Northwestern Journal of
Law and Social Policy 5 (2010): 307.
82 See, e.g., Berg, “Same-Sex Marriage” (above n. 45), 228–232; Wilson, “Insubstantial
Burdens” (above n. 45), 323–326.
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with little practical inconvenience to (or even awareness of) the gay, lesbian, or
transgender person, what is the harm in it?
The harm that accomodationists consider to be at issue, and to be minimal,
is “material” or “transactional” harm: harm to an individual because he or she
cannot get served, rent the apartment, obtain the marriage license, and so on. If
an alternative exists, such harms are (arguably) avoided, or of minimal effect
(although having to drive down the road to another hotel after a tiring day’s
journey is not a de minimus annoyance). Focus on such harms, however, misses
the point. We do not ban discrimination on the basis of race, national origin,
religion, gender, and other grounds because, if we did not, the victim would have
no housing to buy or restaurant to patronize; we ban it because the denial of pubic
goods, facilities, services, and accommodations is itself the evil to be addressed.
There is more than the conveyance of a private “message of disapproval”83 that
the victim should ignore; it is—if tolerated by the greater polity—a statement
that the victim has no valid claim to the equal treatment that the law otherwise
demands. In cases involving race, color, national origin, religion, and gender, the
polity has decreed that identity discrimination is not trivial, and that the interest
in its eradication is not something whose victims are expected to ignore, or whose
sting can be alleviated by accommodations by others. We would never expect a
mixed-race couple to graciously tolerate a discriminatory town clerk, or a Catholic
to graciously tolerate a discriminatory landlord, or a woman to graciously tolerate
a discriminatory employer, because available alternatives exist. The issue is not
only individual transactional difficulties, but societal condemnation. If sexual
orientation and transgender status are identity-based claims of a similar nature,
there is no reason to believe that unequal treatment—including religiously
motivated unequal treatment—is any less violative of the social compact.

4. Conclusion
The liberal-democratic governmental compact assures that citizenship, political
power, and civic participation in all of its forms will be afforded to all citizens on
an equal basis. In particular, simple identity—as a presumptive matter—cannot be
the basis for the denial of human rights. It is on this simple yet elegant principle
that all civil-rights laws are founded.
Freedom of religion presents a particularly complex problem in this context.
On the one hand, it is—itself—a universally recognized member of the human
rights family, and is protected under civil-rights laws. On the other hand, it is—
because of its possible invocation by any person, its self-definition by adherents,

83 See Berg, “Same-Sex Marriage” (above n.45), 229.
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and its unreviewability by courts—a potentially anarchic and undermining force
of all laws, including those that protect the civil (human) rights of others.
When the claimed religious freedom of one citizen conflicts with the claimed
civil rights of other citizens, a choice by the polity must be made. It is not a
question of “painless” accommodation, or the existence of alternatives for the
civil-rights claimant; it is a question of whether the polity, as a whole, will vindicate
the principle of identity equality. We have already recognized and enforced the
principle that all citizens are entitled to political power and civic participation
on an equal basis without regard to their racial, religious, parentage, or gender
identities. It is time to include sexual orientation and transgender status as well.

